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The security-driven design and building standards for new US diplomatic and consular properties introduced in the late 1980s. This development came in the train of a steady escalation in violent ground assaults after the mid-1960s, which culminated in the suicide bomb attack on the American embassy compound in Beirut on 18 April 1983. (A van containing over 400lb of explosives was driven into the side of the embassy, killing approximately 60 people and injuring 120, and completely destroying the central consular section of the building. The 17 US nationals killed included marine guards, senior embassy staff, and CIA employees; in the last category was Robert Ames, director of the CIA\'s office of analysis for the Near East and South Asia.) The new standards were named after Admiral Bobby R. Inman, former head of the National Security Agency and Chairman of the Advisory Panel on Overseas Security which reported in June 1985 (though the detailed work was done in a separate study by the National Research Council).
Inman standards called for missions to be located at remote sites (optimally 15 acres in size), a setback of 100 feet from any surrounding streets, blast-proof construction, an absence of hand-holds of any kind within 15 feet of the ground, windows limited to 15 per cent of the total wall area, safe havens for all embassy personnel including foreign nationals, perimeter walls, electronic vehicle arrest barriers, electronic locks, cameras, and monitors. All of this was far removed from the look of American embassies of the late 1940s and 1950s, buildings which typically featured glass walls, visual openness, and easy access, and were the fruit of a programme directed by Fritz Larkin. Nevertheless, with the Beirut attack still a vivid memory, congressional appropriations of $948 million were made available to build new embassies to these standards and 61 new projects were under way by 1986. Most of these were completed by the early 1990s, but it had become apparent that the financial burden of continuing to impose Inman architecture was becoming insupportable and that a heavy diplomatic price would also be paid if all of America\'s ‘downtown’ embassies in cities such as Rome and Paris were replaced by inaccessible suburban fortresses. However, the State Department\'s subsequent attempt to compromise between the needs of security and diplomacy was called into question following the bombings of the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998. Two Accountability Review Boards directed by Admiral William J. Crowe reviewed these major incidents (the first of which saw great loss of life) and presented recommendations in January 1999. Since that time, the State Department has been reassessing how to upgrade security at its projects worldwide. See also emergency room; warden network. |
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